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I. Introduction
Authority of the Commission to Discipline Attorneys Who
Appear Before It.
HE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, created by Sec-
tion 4 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 has from
its earliest days proclaimed its right to determine who may
appear before or transact business with it in a representative
capacity2 and in Rule 2 (e) of its present Rules of Practice has
reserved to itself the right, in its discretion, to "deny, temporarily
or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it
in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after
notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (1) not to
possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (2) to
be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in un-
ethical or improper professional conduct." 3
* B.A., Catholic University of America; M.A., M.S., LL.B., Georgetown
University. Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Securities and Ex-
change Commission.
The Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1 15 U. S. C. § 78d(a).
2 Rule II of the Commission's Rules of Practice, effective September 13,
1935, dealt with appearance and practice before the Commission; this rule
had the same substantive provisions with respect to the qualification and
disqualification of attorneys as at present (see infra, n. 3), but provided in
addition for a formal admission to practice before the Commission and for
a register of attorneys (1 S. E. C. Ann. Rep. 45-46 (1935); 17 C. F. R.
§ 201.2 (1939)).
The rule was amended in 1938 to eliminate formal admission to practice
and the keeping of a register of attorneys (Securities Act Release No. 1761
(June 27, 1938); and see 4 S. E. C. Ann. Rep. 92 (1938)). The action of the
Commission in amending its rules was in accord with the suggestion subse-
quently urged by interested members of the bar. See Survey of the Legal
Profession, Standards of Admission for Practice Before Federal Administra-
tive Agencies 22 (1953).
3 17 C. F. R. § 201.2 (e) (1964). The power to adopt this rule is found in
Section 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78w (a),
which provides in pertinent part that the Commission may make such rules
and regulations "as may be necessary for the execution of the functions
(Continued on next page)
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The power of an administrative agency to set standards for
determining who may appear and practice before it has long
been recognized. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Ap-
peals4 held that a federal administrative agency which has gen-
eral authority to prescribe its rules of procedure may set stand-
ards for determining who may practice before it. The Court
specifically rejected the argument that the absence in the Board's
statute of an express provision requiring a list of enrolled attor-
neys to which a practitioner must be admitted was indicative of
Congressional intent to deny the power to the Board. On the
basis of Goldsmith, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Herman v. Dulles5 sustained an order of the
International Claims Commission disqualifying an attorney from
practicing before that agency, noting that the agency's governing
statute conferred express authority on it to "prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its
functions." 6 Pursuant to this authority the International Claims
Commission adopted and published certain Rules of Practice and
Procedure. One of these rules provides that an attorney's right
to appear before the Commission may be revoked if the Commis-
(Continued from preceding page)
vested in [it] . . . by this title." Similar power to make rules and regula-
tions is contained in the other statutes administered by the Commission.
See Section 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77s (a); Section
20(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U. S. C. § 79t-
(a); Section 319(a) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U. S. C. § 77sss-
(a); Section 38(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C.
§80a-37(a); and Section 211(a) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U. S. C. § 80b-11 (a).
In addition to the Rules of Practice the Commission has also adopted
a comprehensive Conduct Regulation regarding the conduct of present and
former members and employees: 17 C. F. R. § 200.31 et seq. (1964). Al-
though space limitations forbid a complete analysis of the Conduct Regu-
lation, which is a codification of prior miscellaneous memoranda and which
was adopted in 1953, it may be noted that Rule 6 thereof (17 C. F. R.§ 200.36), which was designed to prevent the unfair use of information by
former members and employees in their private practice of the law before
the Commission, provides in brief that (1) no person shall appear in a rep-
resentative capacity before the Commission in a particular matter if the
person or one participating with him personally considered the matter or
gained personal knowledge of the facts while he was an employee or a
member of the Commission, and (2) for a period of two years after leaving
Commission employment former members or employees must file a state-
ment with the Commission with regard to each matter in which they expect
to appear before the Commission, explaining the nature of the matter and
why their appearance is deemed consistent with the rule.
4 270 U. S. 117 (1926).
5 205 F. 2d 715 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
6 Id. at 716.
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sion finds that the attorney "has failed to conform to recognized
standards of professional conduct." 7 The Court of Appeals noted
that this rule, which is indistinguishable from this Commission's
rule quoted supra, "supports the [International Claims] Com-
mission's action against the appellant." 8
In May 1957 the Commission issued a notice and order for a
private hearing9 pursuant to Rule 2 (e) of its Rules of Practice,
17 C. F. R. § 201.2, to one Morris Mac Schwebel, alleging that
the said Schwebel was an attorney practicing before the Com-
mission within the contemplation of Rule 2, that the Commission
had reason to believe that he had engaged in unethical and im-
proper professional conduct in certain particulars, 10 and setting
a date for a private hearing on the charges to determine whether
respondent Schwebel should be disqualified, temporarily or per-
manently, from practicing before the Commission. Thereupon
respondent filed a motion with the Commission to dismiss the
disqualification proceeding on the ground that the Commission
lacked jurisdiction in the matter and in a supplemental motion
to dismiss alleged that the Commission had failed to comply with
the notice provisions of Section 9 (b) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act." The Commission denied respondent's motions and
extended his time to answer the charges. Instead of answering
the charges respondent filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin the
Commission from maintaining its disqualification proceeding
against him.
7 Ibid.
s Ibid.
9 It is the Commission's usual practice to order that disciplinary proceed-
ings pursuant to Rule 2(e) be held privately, which means that only per-
sons directly connected with the case are made aware of it.
Generally, of course, hearings before the Commission or a hearing offi-
cer are held publicly (Rules of Practice, Rule 11(b), 17 C. F. R. § 201.11-(b)), and notice of such public hearing is given general circulation through
press releases and, where ordered, by publication in the Federal Register
(Rules of Practice, Rule 6(c), 17 C. F. R. § 201.6(c)).
10 The substance of the Commission's findings is outlined in detail herein-
after at Section f e.
11 5 U. S. C. 1008(b), Section 9(b) provides in pertinent part:
"Except in cases of willfulness or those in which public health, interest,
or safety requires otherwise, no withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or an-
nulment of any license shall be lawful unless, prior to the institution of
agency proceedings therefor, facts or conduct which may warrant such ac-
tion shall have been called to the attention of the licensee by the agency in
writing and the licensee shall have been accorded opportunity to demon-
strate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements...."
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On motion of the Commission, the district court dismissed
the complaint and accordingly denied the motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction.12
The Commission's contentions in the district court were
three pronged: (1) that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter-
tain the complaint in view of plaintiff's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies, (2) that plaintiff had alleged no legal-
ly cognizable injury, and (3) assuming the court has jurisdiction
to decide the legal question presented, the Commission's action
was completely within its jurisdiction and proper in all respects.
The district court decided that it had jurisdiction, notwith-
standing the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
to determine the question of the Commission's authority to main-
tain disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff "because of the
peculiar delicacy of an attorney's good reputation, his chief asset
in his profession, and the fact that some members of the public
may assume guilt from disbarment proceedings despite final ex-
oneration." 13 Having thus found jurisdiction the court held,
inter alia, that the Commission has, under its general rule mak-
ing power, authority to establish qualifications for attorneys
practicing before it and to take disciplinary action against attor-
neys found guilty of unethical or improper professional conduct,
citing the Goldsmith and Herman cases.' 4
In affirming dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedy, the
Court of Appeals, in a short per curiam opinion, held that the
district court had erred in reaching the question whether the
Commission had authority to disbar attorneys.15 Thus the ruling
of the district court on the question of the Commission's author-
ity, while undoubtedly sound in its reliance on the Goldsmith
and Herman cases, was properly disclaimed by the Court of Ap-
peals.1 6 A square ruling on the issue will have to await a proper
case.
12 Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701 (D. C. Cir. 1957).
'3 Id. at 705.
14 Supra, n. 4 and 5. Id. at 704.
15 251 F. 2d 919 (D. C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied 356 U. S. 927 (1958).
16 In December 1958 the Commission amended its notice of hearing in the
disqualification proceeding, adding two allegations of improper professional
conduct by respondent. Thereupon respondent filed a second complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to
(Continued on next page)
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II. Factual Analysis of Disciplinary Proceedings Brought by the
Commission Involving Attorneys. 7
a. In the Matter of Albert J. Fleischmann, 37 S. E. C. 832
(1950).
By its order adopted June 5, 1950 and in conformity with
its Findings and Opinion issued concurrently therewith, the
Commission denied to respondent Fleischmann the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it without obtaining its prior ap-
proval, with the proviso that no application for approval would
be entertained for a period of one year from the date of the
order.
The Commission's Findings and Opinion reveals the follow-
ing facts. Respondent, acting as attorney on behalf of a Protec-
tive Committee ("the committee") of preferred stockholders of
Standard Power and Light Corporation ("Standard") formed to
participate in proceedings involving that company under a pro-
vision of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("the
Act"), filed with the Commission on March 18, 1949 a declaration
pursuant to a rule promulgated by the Commission under the
Act. The declaration, which stated that respondent was the com-
mittee's counsel and secretary and was signed by respondent,
recited that the Committee was formed at the request of one
Engel, stated to be the holder of 100 shares of preferred stock
of Standard which he had purchased on March 2, 1948, and by
two others.
The Commission began an investigation on April 1, 1949 and
subsequently ordered a public hearing to determine, inter alia,
whether the declaration contained any untrue statements of ma-
terial fact or omissions of material facts required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading. Prior to the date of the hearing, however, the committee
and respondent filed a petition with the Commission stating that
the declaration was withdrawn and the committee dissolved.
(Continued from preceding page)
enjoin the holding of the administrative proceeding on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. The district court by order of August 28, 1959 denied re-
spondent's motions and dismissed the complaint. Schwebel v. Gadsby
(D. D. C. Civil Action No. 2398-59). Respondent's petition to the Court of
Appeals for a preliminary injunction pending appeal was denied by order
of August 31, 1959 and the appeal was dismissed by order of December 4,
1959. Schwebel v. Gadsby (D. C. Cir., No. 15,338).
17 The cases described herein include all of the disciplinary proceedings
against attorneys brought by the Commission which have been made public.
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Subsequently the Commission ordered a hearing pursuant
to Rule 2 (e), alleging that, contrary to the representations which
respondent caused to be made in the declaration, (1) respondent,
and not Engel, was responsible for the formation of the commit-
tee, (2) respondent, and not Engel, had purchased Standard's
preferred stock and was both record and beneficial owner of it
at the time the declaration was filed, (3) respondent took steps
on or about March 17, 1949 to have the stock transferred to
Engel on Standard's books and prior to the transfer caused Engel
to give him an assignment of the stock in blank, (4) respondent
described the addresses of the committee members and himself
in such a way as to conceal the fact that he and the committee
members maintained law offices at the same address and to cre-
ate the misleading impression that his address and that of the
committee members was different.
Respondent filed an answer to the Commission's charges and
appeared and gave testimony at private hearings before a hearing
examiner, who in due course filed his recommended decision.
Exceptions to the decision were fied by respondent, and the
Commission, on the basis of an independent examination of the
record, found that respondent had engaged in unethical and im-
proper professional conduct in connection with the filing of the
declaration and accordingly entered its order denying to re-
spondent the privilege to practice before it. The Commission
found that respondent had prepared the declaration which con-
tained untrue statements of material facts as alleged or failed to
disclose such facts. The Commission also stated that circum-
stances "strongly suggest" that the transfer and sale of stock to
Engel was a fictitious transaction. Finally, the Commission
found that respondent attempted, through misrepresentation
of his own and the committee's address, to conceal from stock-
holders who were to be solicited in connection with the forma-
tion of the committee, the lack of independence of the committee
from its attorney.' 8
18 Respondent was subsequently readmitted to practice before the Commis-
sion by order of June 12, 1952. The application for readmission represented,
inter alia, that applicant's professional conduct in the future would in all
matters be such that its propriety would not be open to question. The
order of readmission appropriately provided that respondent was readmit-
ted to practice before the Commission "except that he may not appear on
behalf of committees or groups of security holders."
Jan., 1965
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b. In the Matter of William A. Dougherty, 38 S. E. C. 82
(1957).
By its order adopted October 18, 1957 and in conformity
with its Findings and Opinion issued the same day the Commis-
sion denied to respondent Dougherty the privilege of practicing
before it until he obtained the Commission's approval.
The Commission was conducting an investigation of Union
Electric Company ("Union Electric"), a registered public utility
holding company, to determine whether Union Electric and cer-
tain other persons directly or indirectly made political contribu-
tions in violation of Section 12 (h) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 ("the Act").19 The investigation developed
the facts that respondent, in addition to holding other legal and
executive positions, was general counsel and a director of Mis-
sissippi River Fuel Corporation ("Mississippi Fuel"), a natural
gas pipeline company which sold gas at wholesale to Union Elec-
tric, that respondent had drawn a check on the account of his
law firm for $5,000 to his own order, that he had indorsed the
check, and that the check was deposited in a private bank ac-
count of Orville E. Hodge, then Auditor of Public Accounts of
the State of Illinois. 20
Respondent's initial testimony with regard to the check was
that it had been drawn in response to a request by a "friend" for
a loan, that the loan had been repaid, that the friend, whom he
refused to identify, had never been a public official and was not
connected with the state government and that he did not know
how the check had reached Hodge's account. In addition, re-
spondent stated that he had at no time done anything looking
19 Section 12(h) of the Act provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company, or any sub-
sidiary company thereof, by use of the mails or any means or instrumental-
ity of interstate commerce, or otherwise, directly or indirectly-
"(1) to make any contribution whatsoever in connection with the
candidacy, nomination, election or appointment of any person for or to
any office or position in the Government of the United States, a State,
or any political subdivision of a State, or any agency, authority, or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing; or
"(2) to make any contribution to or in support of any political
party or any committee or agency thereof.
"The term 'contribution' as used in this subsection includes any gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value, and
includes any contract, agreement, or promise, whether or not legally en-
forceable, to make a contribution."
20 Prior to the commencement of the Commission's investigation Hodge had
been convicted of embezzling state funds and removed from office.
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toward influencing the passage or defeat of any pending legisla-
tion in Illinois.
Respondent was subsequently recalled for further testimony
but refused to identify his friend, claiming his privilege against
self-incrimination. He was then directed to testify pursuant to
Section 18 (e) of the Act.21 Respondent thereupon testified that
his friend was Hodge; that the loan was a personal one and had
never been repaid; that in making this loan he took into consid-
eration the fact that Hodge, because of his official position, could
be influential in preventing a certain company from building a
pipeline in Illinois which would compete with Mississippi Fuel,
and in preventing passage of any legislation in Illinois which
would subject Mississippi Fuel to the jurisdiction of the Illinois
Commerce Commission. Respondent also testified that Hodge
knew he was counsel for Mississippi Fuel and that Hodge, in re-
questing the loan, said to let him know if he could be of any
assistance on legislation.
Typical of respondent's explanation of some of his earlier
testimony was that when he said he had received repayment of
the full amount of the loan, he meant in experience, not in cash.
The Commission found that respondent in giving his testi-
mony, which contained false and misleading statements, had en-
gaged in improper professional conduct within the meaning of
Rule 2 (e) of the Rules of Practice. Respondent was accordingly
disqualified from practice. 22
21 Section 18(e) of the Act provides:
"No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from pro-
ducing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, contracts, agreements,
or other records and documents before the Commission, or in obedience to
the subpena of the Commission or any member thereof or any officer des-
ignated by it, or in any cause or proceeding instituted by the Commission,
on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subject to any pen-
alty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing con-
cerning which he is compelled to testify or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination,
except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecu-
tion and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying."
The Commission held that the immunity from penalties or forfeitures
granted by Section 18(e) does not extend to disbarment proceedings under
its Rules of Practice, citing In re Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 116 N. E. 782 (1917),
cert. denied 246 U. S. 661 (1918) and 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2257 (3d ed.,
1940).
22 Upon application respondent was readmitted to practice on April 2, 1958,
S. E. C. Holding Company Act Release No. 13716; respondent was, however,
disbarred from practice in New York State on January 6, 1959, In the Mat-
ter of William A. Dougherty, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 971 (App. Div. 1959).
Jan., 1965
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c. In the Matter of James T. DeWitt, 38 S. E. C. 879 (1959).
Cushman Food Company, Inc. ("Cushman") retained re-
spondent DeWitt to represent it in connection with a proposed
public offering of 100,000 shares of its common stock at $3.00 per
share.23 Respondent was also given authority by Cushman to
execute and file with the Commission whatever papers were nec-
essary for the offering. Pursuant to this authority respondent
filed a notification under Rule 255 (a) of Regulation A; he then
advised Cushman to sell the shares covered by the notification,
despite the fact that Regulation A requires a ten-day waiting pe-
riod from the date of filing to the date of the initial offering of
securities. Cushman, acting on respondent's advice, sold more
than 4,000 shares.
The notification also contained financial statements which
were false at the time they were filed, and respondent admitted
he knew they were false. In addition, respondent requested and
received $100 from Cushman which he represented to Cushman
was to be "passed along" to Commission employees. Respondent
admitted, however, that no money, gifts or inducements of any
kind were given to Commission employees.
At a hearing ordered by the Commission to determine
whether respondent had engaged in unethical or improper pro-
fessional conduct respondent filed a "consent to order of dis-
qualification." The Commission in its memorandum opinion and
order stated that respondent's conduct represented "an uncon-
scionable repudiation of the high standards required of a member
of the legal profession," 24 and permanently denied him the privi-
lege of appearing or practicing before it.
d. In the Matter of Sol M. Alpher, 39 S. E. C. 346 (1959).
The Commission instituted a proceeding to determine wheth-
er respondent Alpher had engaged in unethical and improper
23 Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77c (b), permits
the Commission to exempt from the provisions of the Act offerings not ex-
ceeding $300,000 subject to such terms and conditions as the Commission
may impose. Under this authority the Commission has promulgated Regu-
lation A, which consists of Rules 251 through 263, 17 C. F. R. §§ 230.251-263(1964). Upon full compliance with these rules, which provide, among other
things, for the filing of a notification at least ten days prior to the offering
of securities (Rule 255) and the filing and use of an offering circular (Rule
256), there is afforded an exemption "from the principal registration re-
quirements of the Federal securities legislation." R. A. Holman & Co. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 299 F. 2d 127, 128 (D. C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U. S. 911 (1962).
24 38 S. E. C. at 880.
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professional conduct in that, as alleged, (1) he had prepared a
registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 certified
by an accountant who was not independent of the registrant,
knowing that the accountant was required by law to be inde-
pendent but was not in fact so, and (2) he attempted to conceal
from the Commission the lack of independence by withholding
from the registration statement information which would have
disclosed that the accountant was a partner of the person con-
trolling the registrant, and caused the accountant to use his home
address rather than his business address on the certificate.
Respondent's answer was a denial of the allegations, an
averment of reliance upon others believed to be more familiar
with accounting requirements and a statement that any errors
or omissions were honest ones on his part. Respondent also re-
quested the Commission to dismiss the proceeding, stating that
he would not appear or practice before it in the future without
its approval and consented to issuance of an opinion. Respond-
ent also consented to incorporation of the record of a prior pro-
ceeding against the individual accountants and the firm 25 as a
part of the record in this proceeding.
The Commission was of the opinion that the record in the
prior proceedings against the accountants substantiated the alle-
gations in the instant proceeding, but also recognized that re-
spondent was not a party in those proceedings and that in view
of respondent's agreement not to practice no hearing was being
held at which respondent could offer further defense to the alle-
gations. Under all the circumstances the Commission, holding it
was not inconsistent with the public interest to do so, discontin-
ued the proceeding, subject to respondent's agreement not to ap-
pear or practice before the Commission in the future without
obtaining its approval.
e. In the Matter of Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S. E. C. 347
(1960), modified 40 S. E. C. 459 (1961).
The Commission's order instituting the above proceeding
was at first challenged in the courts, as noted supra in the Intro-
25 The Commission had previously instituted Rule 2(e) proceedings against
the accountants involved in connection with the registration statement and
respondent had testified as a witness in that proceeding. The Commission
subsequently found that the accountants had engaged in improper and un-
ethical professional conduct and imposed sanctions. S. E. C. Accounting
Series Release No. 82, In the Matter of Bollt and Shapiro, 38 S. E. C. 815
(1959).
Jan., 1965
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duction, but after failing in that endeavor respondent filed an
answer, hearings were held, and respondent consented inter alia
to (1) withdrawal of his contest of the allegations without admit-
ting their truth, (2) findings by the Commission for purposes of
the proceeding that all the charges but one were established, and
(3) entry of an order permanently disqualifying him from prac-
tice before the Commission.
The Commission found substantially as follows: Respondent,
acting as counsel for Great Sweet Grass Oils, Limited ("Great
Sweet Grass"), a Canadian company, and Kroy Oils Limited
("Kroy"), a Canadian company and affiliate of Great Sweet
Grass, filed periodical reports with the Commission on behalf of
these companies pursuant to Section 13 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.26 One such report of Great Sweet Grass was
deficient, however, and respondent was requested by the Com-
mission to rectify the matter by filing specified supporting data.
Respondent, however, failed to transmit these instructions accu-
rately to his client. In addition respondent failed to inform the
Commission that a letter report by a petroleum engineer, which
had been attached as an exhibit to the report to the Commission,
was unauthorizedly filed, and was inaccurate and out of date.
Respondent also filed with the Commission a report by Kroy.
Whereupon the respondent was informed that the Commission
considered the report to be misleading and requested by letter
that certain specified information be supplied by Kroy. No an-
swer was ever received to this letter, nor was any attempt made
to secure the information requested.
In another instance respondent furnished his legal opinion
to the American Stock Exchange, in connection with his appli-
cation for listing, that 500,000 shares of Great Sweet Grass stock
sold to another Canadian company were not required to be regis-
tered under the Securities Act of 1933 on the ground that such
shares were not to be sold in the United States. Respondent also
filed a periodic report with the Commission describing the above
transaction and claiming exemption from the Act. The Commis-
26 Section 13(a) provides that "every issuer of a security registered on a
national securities exchange shall file the information, documents, and re-
ports below specified with the exchange (and shall file with the Commission
such duplicate originals thereof as the Commission may require), in accord-
ance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to in-
sure fair dealing in the security. . ..
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sion held that the opinion was given and the report filed without
adequate inquiry as to the facts, and later, when respondent
knew or should have known that the stock had been resold in
the United States, he failed to inquire whether his legal opinion
and report to the Commission required revision.
In another transaction, the Commission found that respond-
ent arranged for his client, a broker-dealer, to purchase from
three Canadian companies more than 500,000 shares of Great
Sweet Grass stock for sale in the over-the-counter market in the
United States, but did not sufficiently inquire as to the source of
the shares so as to be able to determine whether the shares
should be registered or not.2 7 Respondent also accepted a finder's
fee of $5,000 from one of the sellers.
In another instance respondent filed a report with the Com-
mission that 500,000 shares of Great Sweet Grass stock were ex-
changed for the assets of a Canadian corporation, and 1,750,000
such shares were exchanged for the assets of an Oklahoma cor-
poration. In connection with the listing of these blocks of stock
on the American Stock Exchange respondent furnished an opin-
ion to the Exchange that registration was not required and
claimed in the report fied with the Commission that the shares
were exempt under Rule 133 of the Securities Act of 1933.28
Subsequent to this time approximately 2,190,000 of these
shares were sold to public investors in the United States without
registration through three broker-dealer firms. One of these
firms, Murray Securities Corporation ("Murray"), a client of
respondent, acquired two 100,000 blocks of Great Sweet Grass
stock from "minority" shareholders and requested respondent's
opinion as to the propriety of selling these shares without regis-
tration. Respondent contacted the Canadian attorney for Great
Sweet Grass, who was in control and a principal stockholder,
and was told that some of the Canadian and American stock-
holders were selling their shares. Without further investigation
respondent advised Murray that his stock could be sold. Accord-
ingly, the Commission found that respondent, on the basis of his
27 If the three Canadian companies were in fact underwriters or "statutory
underwriters" for Great Sweet Grass, there would be no exemption from
the registration provisions of the Act. See Sections 4(1) and 2(11) of the
Securities Act of 1933.
28 Rule 133, 17 C. F. R. § 230.133, provides that no "sale" of securities re-
quiring registration is involved in certain situations in which assets of one
corporation are exchanged for securities of another.
Jan., 1965
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knowledge or what he should have known had he made sufficient
inquiry, had failed to revise his opinion to the Exchange and his
claim of exemption in the report to the Commission2 9 and had
failed to make sufficient inquiry to warrant rendering an opinion
to his client Murray.
Respondent engaged in two other securities transactions in
which through the issuance of erroneous legal opinions to his
clients securities were sold in violation of the Securities Act.
(1) The Basic Atomics Transaction
Respondent, as general counsel of a Delaware company called
Basic Atomics which was in need of financing, suggested that the
company sell its shares in Europe to avoid the expense of regis-
tration. The shares to be sold in Europe were supposedly to be
purchased for investment and not for redistribution in the United
States. Pursuant to this plan 750,000 shares of Basic Atomics
were sold to Huttenwerk Trust ("Huttenwerk") through a Swiss
bank which represented that Huttenwerk was its client, and
these shares, according to a letter to respondent dated Septem-
ber 9, 1955, were said to have been sold to bona fide European
investors at $2 per share. Immediately thereafter, however, on
September 12, which was a Monday, two broker-dealer firms in
New York received orders from the Swiss bank to sell 250,000
shares of this stock, and by December 1955 540,000 of the 750,000
shares of Basic Atomics had been resold to the public in this
country ° at approximately twice the price.
The Commission found that the plan to resell this stock be-
gan concurrently with, if not before, the arrangements for sale to
Huttenwerk,31 and although respondent may not have known all
29 Upon conclusion of proceedings instituted by the Commission the regis-
trations of the securities of Great Sweet Grass and Kroy were withdrawn
from the American Stock Exchange. Great Sweet Grass Oils Limited, 37
S. E. C. 683, aff'd 256 F. 2d 893 (D. C. Cir., 1958). The Commission found in
that proceeding that the exchange of 500,000 and 1,750,000 shares of Great
Sweet Grass were not exempt from registration under Rule 133, as respond-
ent had stated to the Exchange and reported to the Commission. Rather,
there had not been any bona fide reliance on the Rule but only deliberate
efforts to evade the Securities Act by creating corporate entities and effect-
ing transactions meeting the requirements of the Rule in appearance only.
37 S. E. C. at 686-91.
30 All in all about 610,000 shares were distributed in the United States.
31 It seems evident that the person or persons who acquired these shares
did so with the intention to, and did redistribute them in the United States.
Such persons were thus statutory underwriters within the meaning of Sec-
(Continued on next page)
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the facts surrounding the scheme, his knowledge was sufficient
to cast serious doubt on the validity of his continuing opinions to
the officers and the president of Basic Atomics and others that
resales in this country were within the law.
(2) Soil Builders Transactions
Respondent, as general counsel of Soil Builders, engaged in
transactions very similar to that of Basic Atomics, even includ-
ing some of the same participants. The plan ostensibly was to
sell Soil Builders stock in Europe to persons who would take for
investment and not resale in the United States. In fact, however,
most of these unregistered shares were subsequently resold in
the United States at a substantial profit, and respondent's con-
tinuing legal opinions to the president of Soil Builders and others
of the legality of these sales helped to make such sales possible.
On the basis of the above facts the Commission found that
respondent's conduct evidenced a "gross indifference to the ob-
servance of legal requirements which an attorney in particular
should strive to foster, and violated the standards of professional
ethics." [40 S. E. C. at 371]. Respondent was accordingly per-
manently disqualified from practicing or appearing before the
Commission.
3 2
f. In the Matter of Arnold D. Naidich, S. E. C. Securities Act
Release No. 4372 (June 8, 1961).
On the basis of a stipulation the Commission entered an
order in the above case permanently denying the respondent the
privilege of appearing or practicing before it. The stipulation re-
cited (1) that respondent had been convicted in the United States
(Continued from preceding page)
tion 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, which defines underwriter to in-
clude any person who purchases from an issuer with a view to the distri-
bution of any security or who participates in any such undertaking. There
was therefore no exemption available and the shares were sold in violation
of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.
32 The supplemental modifying opinion and order of the Commission did
not disturb the Commission's prior findings and opinion. It merely clarified
a procedural point raised by respondent (40 S. E. C. 459).
Respondent was later indicted in the Southern District of New York,
pleaded guilty on May 1, 1964 to three counts of aiding and abetting the
sale of unregistered stock, and on June 6, 1964 was sentenced to a year and
a day in prison and fines totaling $15,000. S. E. C. Litigation Release No.
2959 (June 9, 1964). Previously respondent had filed motions to dismiss the
indictments, which motions were denied by the court in the following opin-
ions: United States v. Greenberg, 200 F. Supp. 382 (S. D. N. Y., 1961) and
United States v. Greenberg, 204 F. Supp. 400 (S. D. N. Y., 1962).
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District Court for the District of New Hampshire of a violation
of the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (Sec-
tion 5) after having entered a plea of nolo contendere,33 (2) that
respondent had written a letter to the Commission indicating he
would no longer appear or practice before it, and (3) that re-
spondent waived the institution of formal proceedings by the
Commission under Rule 2 (e) and consented to the issuance of
an order of permanent disqualification.
g. In the Matter of Nathan Wechsler, S. E. C. Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 6932, S. E. C. Accounting Series
Release No. 94, C. C. H. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 72,115 (Nov.
5,1962).
The Commission's notice and order for private hearing under
Rule 2 (e) in the above case made certain charges of improper
and unethical professional conduct against respondent Wechsler,
an attorney and certified public accountant. It was alleged hat
respondent had acted as counsel for Lost Canyon Uranium and
Oil Co. ("Lost Canyon"), an issuer of securities under a Regu-
lation A offering, by preparing the offering circular and causing
himself to be listed in the broker-dealer registration statement
of Coombs & Company ("Coombs") as the person to be notified
of any proceedings before the Commission regarding such regis-
tration.
During this period Coombs, which was dominated and con-
trolled by respondent, became the sole underwriter for Lost
Canyon's stock, sold approximately $99,000 worth of it and con-
verted approximately $55,000 of this amount to private purposes.
The proceeds of the sale were not remitted to the issuer and thus
Lost Canyon stock was not delivered to the purchasers. In addi-
tion, although respondent knew Coombs was insolvent during
this time he nevertheless caused it to continue effecting trans-
actions in Lost Canyon stock. Respondent also caused Coombs
to buy from him certain privately held stock at prices not reason-
ably related to the market, and failed to take effective steps to
advise the public and the Commission of Coombs' fraud.
Respondent's answer denied the charges and also denied that
he practiced before the Commission. Respondent also moved for
33 Section 5 of the Act makes it unlawful inter alia to offer or sell securities
in interstate commerce when no registration statement is either on file or
in effect with the Commission.
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a discontinuance of the proceedings on the grounds (a) that his
health was seriously impaired and that a continuation of pro-
ceedings constituted a significant risk of serious aggravation of
his condition, and (b) that he had agreed not to practice before
the Commission in any way in the future.
The Commission accepted the respondent's representations
and entered an order that it was not inconsistent with the public
interest that no further proceedings be held.
h. In the Matter of Erwin Pincus and Pace Reich, S. E. C.
Securities Act Release No. 4619 (June 27, 1963).
The Commission's order for a private hearing in the above
case alleged that respondents prepared and submitted for filing
with the Commission registration statements, prospectuses and
related correspondence on behalf of three corporations pursuant
to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933
and notifications, offering circulars and related correspondence
on behalf of eight corporations pursuant to Regulation A. These
statutory filings were alleged to contain misrepresentations and
omissions of material facts and deceptive and misleading state-
ments with respect to the promotion, financing and management
of certain of these companies, the role and interest of respondents
and certain of their associates in the promotion and management,
and the availability of the claimed exemption under Regulation
A with respect to certain of the companies.
The above general statement of the nature of the Commis-
sion's allegations was particularized in succeeding paragraphs of
the order for hearing. Respondents were charged with making
misrepresentations, omissions of material fact and misleading
statements in their statutory filings on behalf of the above com-
panies as to, inter alia, (1) the existence, identity and stock in-
terests of persons providing financing; (2) the existence, identity
and stock interests of certain officers, controlling persons and
promoters; (3) respondent Pincus' participation as a promoter
of certain corporations and the services he performed; (4) fees
payable to respondents' law firm; (5) the identity of a finder;
(6) the financial condition of the companies; (7) the state of
development of a company's products; (8) the plan of distribu-
tion of the offering and (9) the identity of counsel for the under-
writer.
Jan., 1965
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss1/4
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS BY S. E. C.
Although the pleadings do not present as full a picture of
respondents' activities as they might have it is fairly evident
that the Commission was charging respondents, inter alia, with
misrepresentations, misleading statements and the failure to dis-
close their intricate personal involvement in the promotion and
management of the companies for whom they acted as counsel.
And with respect to respondent Pincus it appears that he may
have been engaged in some form of solicitation of clients, con-
trary to the Canons of Professional Ethics, since he was instru-
mental in promoting certain of the companies and presumably
in encouraging them to seek public financing for which he would,
of course, make appropriate filings with the Commission in his
capacity as counsel.
Whatever the true facts might be the Commission foreclosed
public disclosure of them when it accepted respondents' resigna-
tions from appearance or practice before it 34 and entered an
order that no further proceedings need be held.
i. In the Matter of Leonard A. Nikoloric, S. E. C. Securities
Act Release No. 4642 (Sept. 19, 1963).
The Commission's order for a private hearing in the above
case alleged that respondent prepared and filed with the Com-
mission a notification under Regulation A on behalf of a corpo-
ration but failed to disclose therein that he was himself a pro-
moter of the corporation. In addition, the notification stated that
285,545 shares of the company's stock had been sold privately,
that they had been taken for investment only and not with a view
to distribution to the public, and therefore they were exempt
from registration under Sections 2(11) and 4(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933. As a matter of fact, however, it was alleged, these
unregistered shares had been sold publicly and were not taken
for investment. Furthermore, some of the 14 persons named in
the notification as having been the purchasers were actually
nominees for other persons, and some of the nominees had al-
ready resold their shares even before the notification was fied.
Finally, it was charged that respondent at the time he prepared
and fied the notification knew that the sale of these shares con-
34 Each respondent also agreed that if application should be made in the
future to appear or practice before the Commission he would not, for pur-
poses of considering the application, deny the charges in the Commission's
order for hearing in this case.
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stituted a public offering in violation of Section 5 of the Securi-
ties Act, and that he had himself solicited some of the sales made
to members of the public.
The respondent, while not admitting or denying the allega-
tions of the Commission's order, consented to the entry of an
order disqualifying him from appearing or practicing before the
Commission.35
M. Summary and Conclusions
The body of federal securities law is composed of six sepa-
rate statutes,36 the first of which, the Securities Act of 1933, has
as its central doctrine the principle of disclosure. 37 The Act has
been popularly referred to as the "truth in securities" law and
requires full disclosure in the flotation of securities by means of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the mails, and also prohibits fraud in their sale. Briefly, the Act
requires issuers of securities to register them with the Commis-
sion before they are distributed and to disclose in a prospectus,
of prescribed content, information important to a prospective
investor's assessment of the security offered and the investment
risks involved. It also prohibits fraud and misrepresentation in
the sale of securities on initial distribution or thereafter, but
does not authorize the Commission to pass on the merits of se-
curities or to determine which securities may be offered to the
public.
It follows that when this Congressionally mandated disclo-
sure is denied to public investors through untrue statements
35 Respondent's consent also provided that upon any application by him in
the future for reinstatement all of the allegations in the notice for hearing
would be deemed admitted for the purpose of the Commission's consider-
ation of the application.
36 The statutes are listed supra, n. 3.
The Commission also has the responsibility of advising courts in cor-
porate reorganizations under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C.
§ 608.
37 The other federal securities laws administered by the Commission also
rely heavily on disclosure to accomplish their objectives.
On August 20, 1964 President Johnson signed the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964. The Commission's general interpretive release on
these new amendments, issued on September 15, 1964, described them as
achieving two major objectives, the first of which is "to afford investors in
publicly-held companies whose securities are traded over-the-counter the
same fundamental disclosure protections as have been provided to investors
in companies whose securities are listed on an exchange." S. E. C. Securi-
ties Act Release No. 4725, p. 1; S. E. C. Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7425, p. 1.
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or omission of material facts, misleading statements or misrepre-
sentations, the Congressional purpose is frustrated and the se-
curities laws are rendered nugatory. Thus in the DeWitt dis-
qualification proceeding supra respondent's action in the filing of
deliberately false financial statements with the Commission was
especially reprehensible, since it was a clear violation of both the
letter and spirit of the securities laws in an area of prime interest
to potential investors. It is, in fact, difficult to imagine a more
vital area for accurate, truthful information. The Alpher dis-
qualification proceeding, while not involving such a blatant dis-
regard of the requirements of the Act, was nevertheless a serious
infraction of an extremely important rule, that the certifying
accountant must be in fact independent of the registrant. The
underlying rationale of the rule is, again, complete and especially
objective disclosure of the financial affairs of a company. In
A. Hollander & Son, Inc.,8 the Commission explained that "one
of the purposes of requiring a certificate by an independent
public accountant is to remove the possibility of impalpable and
unprovable biases which an accountant may unconsciously ac-
quire because of his intimate non-professional contacts with his
client. The requirement . .. is not so much a guarantee against
conscious falsification or intentional deception as it is a measure
to insure complete objectivity." 39
Failure to disclose was also the heart of the violations in the
Fleischmann proceeding, where omissions of material facts and
untrue and misleading statements were made by respondent in
the declaration filed by him, the Schwebel proceeding, which in-
volved the repeated filing with the Commission of false and mis-
leading reports and the furnishing of incorrect legal opinions to
his clients and others which the respondent knew or should have
known required revision, the Naidich order, where there was a
total failure to register the stock, the Nikoloric proceeding,
where in a Regulation A filing there was an alleged attempt to
conceal a prior violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933, the Wechsler proceeding, where respondent allegedly knew
of the conversion of the proceeds of the sale of stock and the
insolvency of the broker-dealer but failed to take effective action
to advise the public and the Commission of the fraud, and the
38 8 S. E. C. 586 (1941).
89 Id. at 613.
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
Pincus and Reich proceeding, which involved, among other
things, the alleged filing of false and misleading reports. The
Dougherty proceeding, while not concerned with a failure to dis-
close information in reports filed with the Commission, was nev-
ertheless basically a disclosure proceeding, since respondent by
his initially false testimony was impeding a lawfully instituted
investigation by the Commission.
Every disqualification proceeding brought by the Commis-
sion thus far has involved to a greater or lesser degree a failure
to disclose. This is, of course, no mere coincidence, since each of
the attorneys was dealing with the federal securities laws, the
guiding principle of which is disclosure. Poetic justice would re-
quire, presumably, that where attorneys violate the federal se-
curities laws, or aid and abet such violation, their doings should
be fully disclosed to all the world. Such a penalty suits the vio-
lation and serves as a warning to others of conduct to be avoided.
In this connection it is noted that the last five disqualification
proceedings instituted by the Commission ended in settlements.
The consent in Schwebel, which permitted the Commission to
make findings for purposes of the proceeding that all its charges
but one were established, enabled the Commission to spell out
in detail its findings of violations. This is highly desirable from
an enforcement standpoint since it informs securities attorneys
not only what the law is but what can be expected from the
Commission in its judicial capacity.
The more recent disqualification proceedings generally ter-
minate with a resignation from practice or a consent to disqual-
ification without admitting or denying the Commission's allega-
tions. Although this may not be the most desirable result, it can
be made more palatable through a clearer delineation of the
overall scheme charged in the order for hearing.40 Thus, if the
proceeding ends in a resignation from practice or a consent to
disqualification, the order for hearing alone will tell a fairly
complete story,41 providing an explanation for the resignation,
a justification for the disciplinary order consented to and form-
40 One or more introductory paragraphs in the order should set out, with-
out going into the evidence, the violations in general terms, setting the
stage, as it were, for the specific charges which follow.
41 The Pincus and Reich order for hearing leaves much to be desired in
this respect.
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ing an intelligible starting point 2 in determining any future ap-
plication for reinstatement.
It is perhaps a truism that an attorney's opinion represents
his stock in trade, and the client who asks for and receives such
an opinion properly expects to be able to rely on it. Where, in
a public distribution of securities, an opinion is knowingly incor-
rect or given without sufficient inquiry as to the facts and reli-
ance is thus misplaced, as e.g., in the Schwebel proceeding, the
consequences to the investing public may be disastrous. The
Commission requires in registration statements an attorney's
opinion of the legality of the offering, and when it appears that
that opinion is knowingly incorrect or otherwise improper, the
agency, as guardian of the public interest, must take appropriate
action. It is fair to say that the Commission, in the carrying out
of these responsibilities has, on the whole, effectively utilized its
disqualification procedures.
42 In the case of permanent disqualification any action by the Commission
on a petition for reinstatement would appear to be wholly discretionary.
The Commission would not be confined to those matters appearing in its
public files of the instant petitioner, but could look at any of its files which
have any bearing on the matter.
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